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December 8, 1978 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
' 
No. 78-437-ADX 
CALIFANO (Sec. HEW) 
~1 ~rom D. Mass. 
~;n) 
v. 
WESTCOTT (AFDC claimant) Federal/Civil Timely (w/ 2 extns.) 
No. 78-689-ADX 
SHARP (Comm. Mass. Dept. Pub. same 
Welfare) 
v. 
WESTCOTT same Timely 
SUMMARY: These are direct appe~ls pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1252 from a decision of the United States District Court for -the District pf Massachusetts declaring § 407 of the Social 
Security Act, 42 U.S.Co § 607, unconstitutional as violative of 
the equal protection guarantee of the 5th Amendment. Section 407 
""'---- -
provides AFDC benefits · to two-p9fent families in which a dependent 
child has been deprived of parental support because of the unem-
ployment of 'the father·, but does not provide benefits when the 
mother becomes unemployed. Sec. Califano in No~ 78-437 challenges 






the equal protection decision on the merits, but does not 
question the relief ordered by the DC. Commissioner Sharp in 
No. 78-689 acquiesces in the decision on the merits, but 
challenges the relief. 
BACKGROUND: The Aid to Families with Dependent .Children 
(AFDC) program, 42 U.S.C. § 601 et. seg., provides financial 
assistance to families with needy dependent children. If a 
state elects to participate in the program, it must comply with 
the requirements of the Act and the applicable federal regula-
tions, and its plan must be approved by the Secretary of HEW. 
A state with a qualifying plan is reimbursed by the federal 
government for a percentage of its expenditures. If a state 
that participates in the AFDC program also participates in the 
Medicaid program, individuals who receive AFDC benefits are 
entitled to receive Medicaid benefits. 
As originally enacted in 1935, the AFDC program provided 
benefits only to families whose children were needy because of 
the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent. 42 U.S.C. § 606. 
This provision, which survives today, was gender-neutral: benefits 
. ·-· ,_ __ . - ·- -- -----
are .avail,able to .any · f.amily. _so · long as c:me parent of either 
sex was dead, absent, or incapacitated, and the family meets · the 
financial requirements for eligibility. In 1961 Congress expanded 
the AFDC program to provide assistance to certain families 
where both parents are present and not disabled, but 
the c~~ldren are in n~~qpecause of a parent's un-
employment. Again, this extension was gender-neutral. In 
1967, however, Congress made this extension permanent, and in 
so: doing added a gender classification to the statute. The 




child ••• who has been deprived of pa·rental support or care by 
reason of the unemployment (as determined in accordance with 
standards prescribed by the Secretary) of his father •••• " 
This portion of the program is known as Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF). Al,though all 
50 states participate in the AFDC program, only 26 states (and 
the District of Columbia) take part in the AFDC-UF program. 
One of these states is Massachusetts. 
To be eligible for benefits under the AFDC-UF program, a 
family must meet both categorical and financial requirements. 
The major categorical requirements are that the father must 
have had 6 or more quarters of work in any 13 quarter period 
ending within one year prior to the application for aid, and 
must be currently employed for less than 100 hours per month. 
The financial requirement is that the family's income may not 
exceed the AFDC standard of need. 
FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Appellees are two couples who 
do not qualify for AFDC-UF benefits, eyen though both meet 
the financial requirement of the Act and in both one parent 
is out of work. Cindy and William Westcott are married and have 
an infant son. Cindy was the family brea.dwinner until ·her 
most recent employment as a chambermaid ended in November 1976. 
William has a minimal work history which does not give him 
enough quarters of work to qualify as an unemployed father 
under the Act. Cindy, however, was qualified at the time the suit 
was brought. The parties have stipulated that the Westcotts satisfy 
all conditions of eligibility for AFDC-UF benefits except the 
condition that the unemployed parent be male. 
Susan and John Westwood are married and have two small 
-4-
children. Susan was the family breadwinner from 1972 to 1977, 
working 10-15 hours a week as a .bookkeeper. John is cronically 
unemployed and does not have enough quarters of work to 
qualify as an unemployed father. In 1977 the Westwoods applied 
for Medicaid because they wanted coverage for medical care 
in connection with the birth of the second child. They were 
determined to be ineligible. Again, the parties have stipulated 
that the Westwoods would be eligible for Medicaid but for the 
requirement that the unemployed parent be male. . 
The DC certified the case as a class action under Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(b). Addressing the equal protection claim, the court 
found that there was no question but that § 407 established 
a gender-based classification. Reviewing this Court's most rele-
vant decisions, the court observed that "the standard of review 
of gender based classifications has not been altogether clear." 
Jur. State. 20A. Nonetheless, it concluded that Craig v. Boren, 
429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) and Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 
313 (1977), establish that gender-based distinctions are un-
constitutional unless they "'serve important governmental ob-
jectives and [are] substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.'" Jur. State. 21A-22A. 
After examining the legislative history, the court concluded 
that § 407 was designed to serve two "important governmental 
objectives." First, the Act was intended to secure the protection 
and care of needy children in families without a breadwinner's 
support. Second, it was designed to counteract one of the per-
ceived defects of the original AFDC program, which by making 
assistance available in the event of the absence of a parent 







The court then scrutinized the "fit" between these 
governmental objectives and the gender-based classifica-
tion erected by the statute. It concluded that the classification did 
not further the objective of assisting families with needy 
children who are without the support of a breadwinner, but would 
c~use many families ~ith needy children to go unaided. Specifically, 
families where the unemployed wage earner is female were left without 
AFDC-UF benefits and Medicaid. Furthermore, the classification 
would thwart the objective of preserving family stability. 
In families where the unemployed wage earner is female, and benefits 
are not provided, the father would have the same incentive to 
desert in order to make the family elig.ible as he had prior to 
the passage of§ 407. 
Finally, the court acknowledged that the notion- that fathers are 
more likely to be the primary supporters of their spouses and 
children "is not entirely without empirical support," quoting 
Wiesenfeld v. Weinberger, 420 U.S. 636, 645 (1975). Neverthe-
less, it found that "an assumption that all mothers are not 
breadwinners is clearly archaic and overbroad," and that this 
Court has not hesitated to invalidate gender classifications 
based on "archaic and overbroad generalizations." Jur. State. 
31A. 
The court's discussion with respect to the appropriate 
remedy is summarized in the memo in No. 78-689, attached. 
CONTENTIONS: The SG concedes that § 407 establishes a 
gender-based classification, but contends that this classifica-
tion is constitutional when analyzed under the intermediate 
standard of review set forth in Craig v. Boren, supra, or any 
other standard shor of strict scrutiny. Appellees, in opposition, assert 
-6-
that three district courts have considered the constitutionality 
~. of§ 407, the court below and the courts in Califano v. 
Stevens, No. 78-449, and in Califano v. Browne, No. 78-603; 
that all of these courts had little difficulty concluding 
that the statute was infirm; and that the decision below 
should be affirmed. 
The SG advances four reasons why the Court should afford 
this case plenary review. first he argues that § 407 differs 
from other gender-based statutes considered by the Court in 
that although the Act imports a distinction based on gender, 
it does not have gender-biased consequences. The Act does not 
award benefits to a father where it denies benefits to a mother. 
The award or denial of benefits in each case affects an entire 
family, which will impact to an equal degree one man, one woman, 
and children of either or both sexes. 
Second, the SG submits that the limitation of aid to families 
where the father is unemployed was not "the accidental byproduct 
of a traditional way of thinking about females." Califano v. 
Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
Rather, it was the result of an "actual, considered legislative 
choice." Ibid. The 1967 Committee Reports give the following 
explanation for the inclusion of the limitation: 
This program was originally conceived as one to provide 
aid for the children of unemployed fathers. However, 
some States make families in which the father is working 
but the mother is unemployed eligible. The bill would 
not allow such situations. Under the bill, the program 
could apply to the children of unemployed fathers. 
H.R. Rep. No. 554, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (1967). 
Thus, the statute does not reflect "archaic and overbroad" 
stereotypes about women. It was, instead, part of a conscious 







the original AFDC program. 
Third, the SG contends that the gender classification is 
substantially related to the objective of reducing the 
incentive of unemployed fathers to desert their families. 
In enacting § 407, Congress heard testimony that 65% of all 
families receiving AFDC payments were those where both parents 
were alive but the father was absent from home. In contrast, 
the families in which the father was present but the mother 
was dead, incapacitated, or absent for any reason made up only 
1.8% of all AFDC families. Congress therefore acted on solid 
statistical evidence when it concluded that males are more 
likely to desert their families than females. Although, as 
the DC suggested, it is possible that there would also be an 
incentive for the father to desert where the mother, who had 
been the breadwinner, became unemployed, "this was not the 
pressing problem that confronted Congress." Jur. State. 14. 
Fourth, the SG argues that this case is distinguishable 
from other decisions by this Court involving gender classifi-
cations in the Social Security area. Unlike Social Security 
retirement or disability payments, which are based on contribu-
tions or taxes paid by a worker, AFDC payments are based on 
a general, non-participatory welfare program. Thus, § 407 
does not "denigrate ••• the efforts of women who do work and 
whose earnings contribute significantly to their families' 
support." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, supra, 420 U.S., at 645. 
In a footnote, the SG informs the Court that the Secretary 
has estimated that the total cost in fiscal year 1980 of extending 
AFDC-UF benefits to families in which the mother but not .the 
father is unemployed will be $510.7 million. Jur. State 7 n. 6. 
.• 
-8-
The appellees respond that the argument that this case is 
somehow different because there is no "loser" on the basis 
of sex is simply frivolous. Section 407 discriminates against 
mothers in two-parent homes, such as the appellees in the 
present case, by denying them and their families needed 
welfare benefits that they would concededly have been provided 
if they were male. Appellees also contend that the casual 
substitution of the word "father" for "parent" in 1967, with 
only a passing reference in the Committee Reports, indicates 
that even in 1967 Congress was simply acting on the archaic 
and overbroad assumption that women are dependent on their 
husbands and that they are child-rearers and homemakers rather 
than family breadwinners. 
Appellees acknowledge that a central purpose of the AFDC-
UF program was to mitigate the problem of deserting fathers. 
But they agree with the DC that the gender discrimination of 
§ 407 is irrational in light of that purpose. Families such 
as the Westcotts and the Westwoods, no less than families where 
the father has been the breadwinner and is unemployed, face the 
dilemma of remaining together and foregoing benefits or- separating 
so that the remaining parent and children can qualify. In fact, 
the record shows that after the Westcotts were denied AFDC-UF 
benefits, their landlord, impatient for overdue rent, suggested 
that William Westcott leave the horne so that Cindy and her 
unborn child would be eligible for AFDC. Jur. State. 27A n. 16. 
DISCUSSION: The SG suggests only one governmental objective 
served by § 407's gender classification: the promotion of 
family stability. For a two-parent family that meets the financial 
requirements for AFDC eligibility, there are nine situations 
-
-9-
where the family might have an incentive to separate in 
order to obtain AFDC benefits under the traditional absent-
from-home criterion. (1) Where the father is unemployed and 
the mother is not in the labor force (i.e., is unemployed 
but does not meet the categorical requirements of the Act). 
(2) Where the father is unemployed and the mother is unemployed. 
(3) Where the father is unemployed and the mother is employed 
in a modest paying job. (4) Where the father is not in the 
labor force and the mother is not in the labor force. (5) 
Where the father is not in the labor force and the mother is 
unemployed. (6) Where the father is not in the labor force and 
the mother is employed in a modest paying job. (7) Where the 
father is employed in a modest paying job and the mother is 
not in the labor force. (8) Where the father is employed in 
a modest paying job and the mother is unemployed. And (9)Where 
the father is employed in a modest paying job and the mother 
is employed in a modest paying job. Appellees argue that the 
statute is irrational because it covers only situations (1), (2), 
and (3) and does not cover other situations where there are 
two parent families with needy children. However, even if 
the decision below were affirmed, the statute would then reach 
only situations (1), (2), (3), (5) 1 and (8). This suggests 
that there are "irrationalities" in the statute that go beyond 
the imposition of a gender qualification. In particular, the 
most needy families of all--those where both the father and the 
mother have been out of work so long that neither qualifies 
as "unemployed"--would not qualify for AFDC-UF even with the 
reference to gender removed. On the other hand, a family where 
-10-
the father is employed in a modest paying job and the mother 
is unemployed would qualify. 
Although the statute appears to be irrational both because 
of the gender classification and otherwise, at least when 
viewed in terms of abstract situations, the thrust of the 
SG's argument is that Congress legislated on the basis of 
what it believed to be the most common situations existing 
in the real world--where the father is unemployed and the 
mother is not earning enough to bring the family above the 
AFDC financial requirements. There appears to be some support ., 
for this ·interpretation in the legislative history. Moreover, 
the SG has a plausible point that the gender classification 
of § 407 presents issues that are somewhat different from 
those considered in cases like Weinberger v. Weisenfeld that 
involve contributory retirement and disability programs. 
Finally, the separate appeal by Commissioner Sharp in No. 
78-689 raises serious questions about the appropriate relief 
in th~s case, and if those issues are to be addressed, the 
merits of the equal protection claim should be considered 
too. 
I would note. There is a motion to affirm. 
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December 8, 1978 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 1 
No. 78-689-ADX 
SHARP (Comm. Mass. Dept. 
Public Welfare) 
v. 
WESTCOTT (AFDC claimant) 
~rom D. Mass. 
~n) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1252, which permits any 
party who has received notice of appeal to take a subsequent 
or cross appeal, the Commissioner of the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of Public Health challenges the relief entered by the 
DC in this case . Appellant contends that it should be allowed 
to limit AFpC-UF payments ~o families whose children are needy 
because the "principal wage-earner" is unemployed. The facts and 
general statutory background are set forth in the memo in No. 78-437. 
-2-
DECISION BELOW: Section 407 of the Social Security Act 
( defin~s the tenn "dependent child"to include "a needy child 
who meets the [financial requirements of § 406] who has been 
deprived of parental support or care by reason of the un-
employment (as detennined in accordance with standards pre-
scribed by the Secretary) of his father •••• " Thus, the Act 
gives the Secretary of HEW the authority to set standards 
for the "unemployment" necessary to make a family eligible 
for AFDC benefits. The regulations adopted by the Secretary 
require each state to adopt a definition of an unemployed 
father that "must include any father" who meets certain stated 
requirements. 45 C.F.R. § 233.100(a)(l). Accordingly, Massachusetts 
adopted regulations that limited eligibility for AFDC-UF pay-
~--------------~ ----------------~--ments to needy families with unemployed fathers. 
The DC concluded that § 407 violates the equal protection 
guarantee of the 5th Amendment, and also concluded that 
the Massachusetts regulations violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the 14th Amendment. The DC considered that it had 
two remedial choices: elimination of the AFDC-UF program al-
together or extension of the AFDC-UF program to include all 
children of needy families where either the father or the 
mother was unemployed .within the meaning of the Act and imple-
menting regulations. Applying the test articulated by Mr. 
Justice Harlan in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 365 (1970), 
focussing on "the intensity of commitment to the residual policy" 
and "the degree of disruption of the statutory scheme that 
would occur by extension as opposed to abrogation," the DC 
opted for extension. Accordingly, it enjoined the Massachusetts 
Commissioner from refusing to grant AFDC-UF benefits to families 
-3-
with children deprived of parental support by reason of the 
( unemployment of the mother. It also enjoined the enforcement 
of § 407 insofar as it acted to prevent the Secretary of HEW 
from paying federal matching funds to Massachusetts for the 
payment of AFDC banefits to families who would be ~ligible but 
£or the fact that the mother rather than the father was un-
employed. 
Appellant then moved for clarification or modification of 
the DC's opinion and order to permit the adoption of Massachu-
setts ~egulations tha~ W?uld provide benefits only to families 
with dependent children who were deprived of parental support 
by reason of the unemployment of the parent who had been the 
principal wage-earner. On August 9, 1978, the DC declined 
~ 
to amend its order, concluding that any further reformulation 
~ of the statutory scheme beyond deletion of the gender distinction 
was a matter for Congress, not the courts, and that the State 
was "'not free to narrow the federal standards that define the 
categories of people eligible for aid' under the AFDC program," 
v 
quoting quem v. Mandley, 46 U.S.L.W. 4594, 4598 (U.S. June 
6, 1978). 
CONTENTIONS: Appellant analyzes the AFDC-UF program in 
terms of two models: a _ sing~e parent model, whereby benefits 
would be paid to a needy family when a key individual--the bread-
winner--became unemployed, and a two parent model, whereby 
benefits would be paid to a needy family when either of two 
paren~s became unemployed, regardless of who was the bread-
winner. Appellant contends that the critical inquiry is what 
form of sex-neutral AFDC-UF program, if any, Congress would 
have established if it had known of § 407's constitutional 
-4-
defect at the time of its enactment. Appellant maintains 
that the legislative history of ·§ 407, the structure of the 
Act, and considerations of comparative costs, all indicate 
that Congress would have selected the single parent gender-
neutral model, rather than the two parent model. The DC's 
order, however, by simply extending eligibility to needy 
families with unemployed mothers, as well as needy families 
with unemployed fathers, has mandated the adoption of the two 
parent model. 
The legislative history of the original 1961 version 
of the AFDC-UF program indicates that the AFDC program was 
expanded "to include families in which the breadwinner is un-
employed." S. Rep. No. 165, 87th Cong., 1st Sees. 1 (1961). 
"Breadwinner," according to appellants, denotes a status which 
only one member of a family can hold at a given time. The 
1968 revision also supports the view that Congress intended to 
adopt the single parent model. The reason given for restricting 
elegibility to families with unemployed fathers "Z~as that 
"some States make families in which the father is working but 
the mother is unemployed eligible"--in other words, some 
states were affording benefits to families where the breadwinner 
had steady employment. 
The single parent model is also supported by consideration 
of the structure of the Act. The Act imposes both categorical 
and financial requirements for eligibility. The principal 
categorical requirement is that the father must be employed for 
less than 100 hours per month. The single parent model would 
retain this requirement by conditioning eligibility upon the 
principal wage-earner being employed less than 100 hours per 
-5-
month. The two parent model would remove this requirement, 
by permitting one parent, and then the other, to satisfy 
the unemployment cirterion by working less than 100 hours, 
while the other parent could work more than 100 hours. 
As a result, the Act would be limited only by the financial 
requirement. 
Finally, appellant submits that the DC failed to consider 
the cost differential between the single parent and the two 
parent model of the AFDC-UF program as an index of Congressional 
intent. Appellant estimates that the dual parent model would 
cost Massachusetts $2,580,000 more than the single parent 
model in the first year alone. 
Appellees respond that there is no support for the "principal 
wage-earner" test in the plain language of § 407, and that 
the frequent references to ''breadwinner" in the legislative 
history and the apparent disapproval of the payment of benefits 
to families who were not acutally deprived of a breadwinner's 
support does not justify re-writing the statute. Further-
more, the argument that the DC's order would eliminate the 
requirement of unemployment is simply wrong. The Act makes 
clear that there must be a parent ·who can satisfy all the 
requirements for being unemployed,· including the prior work 
history test. 
More generally, appellees submit that appellant is really 
arguing about the proper policy to follow in affording 
welfare benefits to families with needy dependent children, 
and that these policy considerations should be left for 
Congress. For example, they point out that adoption of the 
principal wage-earner test would mean that families currently 
-6-
receivi~g benefits based on the father's un~p~oyment would 
(~ be terminated unless the father could show that he was 
also the principal wage-earner. 
The SG has also filed a memorandum opposed plenary review 
of appellant's claim. The SG notes that under § 407 ~. it is 
the Secretary, not the states, who has the authority to set 
standards for the unemployment necessary to make a family 
eligible for AFDC benefits. Because the DC's order did not 
purport to restrict the Secretary's authority to define 
"unemployment" in any gender-neutral way, or to prevent any 
state dissatisfied with the federal standards to withdraw 
form the AFDC-UF program. the DC's order is correct. The SG 
---------~-------- -----asks that the Court defer consideration of this appeal pending 
-----------~ - -
its decision in Califano v. Westcott, No. 78-437. If the Court affirms 
the judgment in Westcott, it should affirm the portion of the 
order challenged here. If the Court reverses in Wescott, then 
it will be unnecessary to consider the propriety of the relief 
ordered. 
DISCUSSION: Appellant has raised serious questions about the 
proper form of relief which warrant plenary consideration if 
the equal protection question is given plenary consideration. 
The argument from the literal language of the statute cannot 
be controlling. There is no more support in the statute 
for requiring the payment of benefits to families with an 
unemployed "parent" than there is for requiring the payment of 
benefits to families with an unemployed "principal wage-earner." 
There are at least ~ende:-n~utral ways of refo~ulating 
the Act, and congressional intent should be the central factor ,-.----




made a strong if not compelling case for the "two parent model.,. . 
Full consideration of his contentions should not be too 
burdensome if the Court must, in any event, review the 
structure and function of § 407 in order to dispose of the 
Secretary's appeal. 
I would note and set for argument with Califano v. Westcott, 
No. 78-437. There is a motion to affirm and a memo from the SG. 
11/29/78 Merrill DC op. in No. 78-437; 
order in Jur. State. 
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-437, Califano v. Westcott 
No. 78-689, nharp · v~ · westcott 
The first of these cases, No. 78-437, presents the 
questio~het~a gender-based discrimination in Section 407 
of the Social Security Act violates the Equal Protection 
Clause. Th~cond case, No. 78-689, raises issues concerning 
the remedy that should be ordered by the District Court if 
Section 407 is unconstitutional. 
I 
Section 407 provides that if a family meets the need I 
criteria of the AFDC program, and if the father is unemployed, 
the family qualifies for AFDC assistance. By implication, 
families in which the mother is unemployed are ineligible. The 
DC held that this statute violates the riqhts of the appellees 
under the Equal Protection Clause. 




Mohammed, No. 77-6431, you state the standard for assessing the 
constitutionality of gender-based statutory distinctions. 
"Gender-based distinctions 'must serve governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to 
achievement of those objectives' in order to 
withstand judicial scrutiny under the Equal 
Protection Clause." Printed Draft, at 7, quoting 
Craiq v; -Boren, 404 u.s. 190, 197 (1977). 
Three pages later in the Caban draft, you cite with approval 
the reiteration in Re~d v; ·Reed of the standard stated in 
Roys~er · Goanq · co~ · v~ · virginia,, 253 u.s. 412 (1920): such a 
statutory "classification 'must be reasonable, not arbitrary, 
and must rest on some ground of difference having a fair and 
substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that 
all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.'" 
The present case illustrates some of the difficulties 
with applying the foregoing standard. While it is obvious that 
some governmental objectives are themselves proscribed by the 
Equal Protection Clause, see,~' Zablocki - v; · Redhail, 434 
u.s. 374, 398 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (miscegenation 
statute based on a classification "directly subversive of the 
principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth 
2. 
Amendment"), this leaves a wide universe of legitimate 
I To .ln.,~. 
governmental objectives. It will be a rare statute indeed that 
cannot be said to serve one or more of these objectives, and 
yet, depending upon which of these objective one focuses upon, 
the statute may achieve the purpose with more or less 
completeness and more or fewer objectionable side effects. In 
3. 
part this problem of multiple objectives can be dealt with by ~ 
restricting judicial attention to the objectives actually ~ 
entertained by the legislature when it enacted the statute. 
~, Trimble v. Gordon, 430 u.s. 762, 774-776 (1977). ..4o ~1-~ 
~~ r---"' 
If the legislative history of the statute indicates, 
~ 
however, that the legislature had multiple objectives that it /7- I._ • • 
-,-~11.-t!A-
sought to serve by enactment of the statute, restriction of 
attention to actual legislative purpose will not resolve the 
question. The parties to the present case, for example, 
...____ 
suggest two different purposes that Congress had in 
contemplation when it enacted Section 407. Assuming that both 
purposes were important reasons for the passage of Section 407, 
you must decide how to accommodate such a situation to the 
analysis outlined above. (I will leave asioe for the moment 
the difficult factual questions about legislative purpose that 
necessarily are raised in applying the equal protection 
standard set out above, and will assume that the purposes 
suggested by the parties are adequately evident from the 
legislative history of §407.) 
The SG suggests that Section 407 was enacted to remove 
the incentives for paternal desertion created by the original 
------------~----~---
AFDC program. Under that program, only needy children in 
single-parent homes were eligible for aid. This restriction of 
aid to single-parent families encouraged desertion by one 
parent: the SG says that experience showed that fathers often 
4. 
deserted while mothers rarely did so. He also indicates that 
this experience was before Congress in the form of studies and 
surveys at the time that Section 407 was enacted, and that 
members of Congress referred to Section 407's purpose of 
removing the incentive for family dissolution. 
~ees, on the other hand, insist that the ~ 
primary purpose of Section 407 was ~extend the benefits of 
the AFDC program to the children of unemployed parents. They, 
too, cite statements by various members of Congress that seem 
to take this view of the purpose of the statute; in addition, 
they rely on the temporary (1961 - 1967) precursor of Section 
407, which extended benefits to children of an unemployed 
"parent" rather than just an unemployed "father." 
If the governmental objective is avoidance of family 
dissolution, and if experience shows that the only substantial 
threat is from paternal desertion, then Section 407 appears 
somewhat carefully chosen to accomplish that purpose. If, 
however, the governmental objective is aid to needy children of 
unemployed parents, then the gender-classification in Section 
407 is much less adequate to the legislative purpose, and in 
fact frustrates that objective in those cases in which the 
mother rather than the father is unemployed. 
Of course, the judgment that the statute serves one of 
multiple purposes less well than another does not necessarily 
mean that the statute is unconstitutional. A problem arises 
only if the relationship between the statute and at least one 
of the objectives is too tenuous to satisfy the Equal 
Protection Clause. Even then, one must decide whether a more 
substantial relationship to another legitimate objective will 
save the statute. 
I think that this case can be decided, however, 
without confronting that question. Even assuming that one of 
'-------------~-----
the objectives was the prevention of dissolution of families, 
and that almost always it is the father rather than the mother 
that deserts the family, it is not at all clear that 
conditioning relief on the unemployment of the father will 
accomplish the objective. The SG does not cite any evidence 
before Congress, or any statements by members during the 
consideration of §407, that indicated any empirical basis for 
the assumption that fathers usually or always desert because 
they, rather than the mother, have become unemployed. In the 
absence of such information, Section 407, even as a response to 
the problem of paternal desertion, appears to be a legislative 
incorporation of outmoded stereotypes of men as family 
~ 
~~-----------------------------------------breadwinners rather than a careful response to the problem at 
hand. Accordingly, it would be difficult to conclude that the 
use of the gender-based classification has a fair and 
substantial relation to the objective of minimizing family 
dissolution, much less to the objective of providing aid to 
children of unemployed parents. 
5. 
If the statute is not substantially related to the 
accomplishment of either of the objectives which it is said to 
serve, then the sorting out of the factual questions regarding 
legislative purpose need not be undertaken. As you have seen 
from the briefs in this case, there is at least some support in 
the legislative history for supposing each of the two suggested 
o~s to have been important to at least some members of 
Congress. I think it will be best if I wait for a specific .. ~ 
6. 
instruction from you on this poin,t before I take the time to~ 
read through the reports and debates on the statute. 
Upon finding the 
II ( 7'?- "~"j) 
gender-based classificat1on in 
Section 407 unconstitutional, the DC ordered as a remedy -
benefits under that section be paid to any otherwise qualified 
family in which the mother or the father is unemployed. In No. 
78-689, th~ appellant, the Commissioner of the Massachusetts 
----------Department of Public Welfare, contends that a much narrower 
--------------~-
remedy should be ordered. He argues that the DC should have 1 ~· 
mandated extension of Section 407 benefits be paid to otherwis;~ 
eligible families in which the principal breadwinner is 
unemployed. 
Upon finding a portion of a statute unconstitutional, 
a DC under some circumstances may enjoin any enforcement of the 
statute. This in effect wipes the law off the books and leaves 
the legislature free to start over. 
Under other conditions, however, the adoption of such 
a remedy may be unjustified. Here, for example, we are dealing 
with a social security program the benefits of which are 
extremely important to at least some recipients. Moreover, 
Section 1103 of the Social Security Act, 42 u.s.c. §1303, 
-z::_ 
contains the following provision: 
"If any provision of this Act, or the application 
thereof to any person or ~ircumstance, is held 
invalid, the remainder of the Act and the 
application ,of such provision to other persons or 
circumstances shall not be affected thereby." 
Viewed in conjunction with the importance of Section 407 to the 
recipients of aid under the AFDC-UF program, I think that 
Section 1103 supports the ad~tion of a remedy that Qreserves 
the statutory program while substituting the appropriate gender-
neutral classification. None of the parties to this appeal 
take issue with this conclusion. 
What the parties do disagree about, as stated above, 
is the definition of the appropriate gender-neutral 
classification. The appellant argues that Section 407 benefits 
should be available to an otherwise eligible family with an 
unemployed principal breadwinner. The appellees, on the other 
hand, argue that benefits should be available to needy families 
with an unemployed parent. 
The appellant's position on this point rests on 
----------------------------several simple but persuasive arguments. First, it may be true 
that the constitutional flaw in Section 407 is that Congress 
7. 
made an unfounded assumption that it was always the father's 
unemployment that creates family need and incentives for family 
dissolution. But when Congress, working on the basis of that 
assumption, provided for aid to needy families with unemployed 
fathers, it thought that it was providing for benefits upon the 
unemployment of the principal breadwinner. Therefore, the 
appropriate remedy is to substitute "principal breadwinner (or 
wage-earner)" for "father" in the statute. 
Second, when Congress enacted the temporary precursor 
of Section 407, it provided for aid to needy families with an 
unemployed "parent." In the committee reports on Section 40 7, 
one unintended consequence of the use of the term "parent" in 
the temporary statutes was noted. 
"This program was originally conceived as one to 
provide aid for the children of unemployed fathers. 
However, some States make families in which the 
father is working but the mother is unemployed 
eligible. The bill would not allow such 
situations. Under the bill, the program could 
apply only to the children of unemployed fathers." 
Since Congress was proceeding on the assumption that fathers 
are the principal breadwinners, its action in adopting Section 
407 thus was tantamount to deciding that only the unemployment 
tc 
of the pricipal breadwinner should establish eligibility under 
-~------~~----,---------------
Section 40 7. ------- In adopting a remedy for the unconstitutional legislative assumption, the courts should honor the underlying 
congressional intention. 
Third, the difference in the estimated costs of the 
8. 
9. 
principal-breadwinner remedy and the DC's remedy is 
significant. The appellant estimates the cost of the former at 
an increase of $3.3 million over the current budget of $30 
million for the Massachusetts AFDC-UF program. In contrast, he 
estimates that the DC's remedy will cost $23 million. He U/v-W _I 
argues that other things being roughly equal, the courts should 
be reluctant to choose the remedy requiring the greater 
additional expenditure. 
The individual appellees, on the other hand, urge that 
the principal-breadwinner remedy suggested by the appellant 
requires a much more thoroughgoing rewriting of Section 407 
than does the DC's remedy. Under the appellant's principal-
breadwinner remedy, they point out, some families that are 
eligible under Section 407 as enacted by Congress will lose 
their eligibility if the unemployed father is not determined to 
be the principal breadwinner. Judicial extension of the 
statute to include persons not provided for by the original 
statute is one thing, the appellees argue, but judicial 
revision that excludes those eligible under the original 
statute is quite another. The courts will observe the proper 
limits on their role more closely if they refrain from such 
revision; in this case, that means simply ordering Section 407 
benefits for the needy families of unemployed parents. 
The problem with this argument is the change in 1967 
from "any parent" to "father" in Section 407. This change, as 
explained in the report quoted above, makes it clear to me that 
Congress did not intend the unemployment of any parent to -
suffice for eligibility. Rather, only the unemployment of the 
~------------------------father counts. If the assumption on which the selection of 
"father" was based is constitutionally flawed, the remedial 
substitution still should be consistent with the congressional 
rejection of the "any parent" standard. Since the flawed 
assumption was that only fathers are the principal or important 
breadwinners in families, then, the appropriate substitution 
for "father" is "principal breadwinner." 
The United States is also an appellee in No. 78-689. 
The SG's arguments in support of his contention that the DC has 
no authority to adopt the principal breadwinner remedy are 
~-------------------------------------unpersuasive. ---------
The SG argues first that because Section 407 qives the 
Secretary of HEW authority to make regulations concerning the 
exact definition of unemployment for AFDC-UF eligibility, the 
Secretary's present regulations limit the remedial powers of 
the courts. In particular, he argues that 
"the regulations now in force require that each 
participating state adopt a definition of 
unemployed father that 'must include any father' 
who meets stated requirements. 45 C.F.R. 233.100. 
That regulation, with a sex-neutral construction, 
requires that a state plan include any parent who 
meets federal requirements of unemployment. No 
federal rule requires an 'unemployed' father (or 
parent) to show that he has been the principal wage-
earner in the family." Br. of SG, at 7. 
The SG's second argument is really just a variation of the 
1 0. 
first. He contends that in the form of the Secretary's 
rulemaking authority under Section 407, Congress has already 
"prescribed a specific device for filing statutory gaps. That 
device is the issuance of regulations by the Secretary. The 
Secretary, not the Court, must decide whether and how 
'unemployment' should be redefined in light of any 
constitutional flaw in the statute." Id., at 8. 
There are a number of problems with the SG's argument. 
It contains, for example, at least one glaring non sequitur, 
quoted above, in the argument that a sex-neutral construction 
of the "any father" regulation must consist of substituting 
"parent" for "father." While qender-neutrality requires at - -
least the substitution of "parent" for "father," this leaves 
open the principal question in this remedy phase of the case 
should the category "parent" be qualified to include only the 
"principal wage-earner or breadwinner" parent. 
The critical flaw in the SG's argument, however, rests 
~~~-----------------
in his mistaken overestimation of the importance of the 
Secretary's rulemaking authority under Section 407. The 
Secretary's present regulations have been adopted pursuant to a 
statute now held to be unconstitutional in certain aspects. 
Assuming that the courts will adopt a remedy that reconstructs 
the statute to remove the unconstitutionality while remaining 
as faithful as possible to congressional intent, any 
regulations inconsistent with that reconstructed statute will 
11. 
be invalid. It puts the cart before the horse to say that 
those existing regulations constrain the courts in devising the 
necessary remedial reconstruction of the statute. 
Of course, after the courts have settled the 
classification to be substituted for "father" in Section 407, 
the Secretary will have to make corresponding changes in his 
regulations. But there is no reason I can think of why the 
courts should leave to the Secretary the final determination of 
the proper remedy for Section 407's gender-biased 
classification. This seems to me to be an essentially judicial 
task. Once this Court and the DC have settled on the adoption 
of either the "any parent" or the "principal wage-earner" 
classification as a remedial substitute for the "any father" 
category of Section 407, that new classification can be 
substituted in the Secretary's existing regulations as well 
until the Secretary can take the necessary administrative steps 





Memo to File Date: April 16, 1979 
L.F.P., Jr. 
No. 78-437 Califano v. Westcott 
No. 78-689 Sharp v. Westcott 
This is a pre-argument memo to summarize my 
tentative thinking (see Bruce's memo of 3/27/79 that is 
persuasive): 
Califano v. Westcott 
--
Section 407 of the Social Security Act provides 
that if a family meets the need criteria of the AFDC 
Program, and if the father is unemployed, the family 
qualifies for assistance. But if the mother is unemployed, 
it does not qualify. The DC invalidated this as gender 
based discrimination. 
In Caban, I stated that the standard requires that 
such a distinction must serve governmental objectives and 
"must be substantially related to the achievement of those 
objectives". 
The SG argues that the principal objective in 
focusing on the father was to remove the incentive for the 
father to desert the home when he became unemployed. But 
certainly another primary purpose of Section 407 was to 
provide AFDC benefits to the children of unemployed parents. 
The later objective is not served by Section 407. 
But the difficulty with the gender based 
distinction is that it does not bear a substantial relation 
to the asserted purpose of keeping the unemployed father "in 
the house". It certainly bears no relation to the purpose 
of providing aid to the children of unemployed parents. 
Even if, as a generality, fathers are more likely 
to be unemployed than mothers since more of them work, this 
is by no means invariably true - particularly now when the 
work force is composed to a major extent of women. 
In sum, I find it difficult to defend the validity 
of the classification when it serves one of the purposes 
only marginally, and the other purpose not at all. I am 
inclined to affirm 78-437. 
Sharp v. Westcott 
This is a related case that we must decide only if 
we agree that Section 407 is invalid. The DC ordered as a 
remedy that benefits under that Section be paid to any 
otherwise qualified family in which the mother or the father 
is unemployed. 
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the appellant 
in this case, contends that a narrower remedy should be 
ordered: namely, that eligibility under Section 407 should 
arise only when the principal breadwinner is unemployed. 
2. 
In short, rather than authorize benefits when 
either the mother or father is unem?loyed (as the DC 
ordered), Massachusetts would require benefits only where 
the "principal breadwinner" is unemployed. It is argued 
that the DC's remedy will cost the state of Massachusetts 
$23,000,000, as contrasted with about $3,000,003 under its 
proposed resolution. 
I am inclined to agree with Massachusetts. It is 
clear that one of the congressional purposes was to provide 
benefits when the primary family provider was unemployed. 
The vice in the statute is that it ignores the fact that the 
mother could occupy this role. If the remedy makes benefits 
turn on whether or not the "principal breadwinner" is 
unemployed, this basic purpose of Congress will be met. 
I therefore am inclined to reverse the DC 
in 78-689. 
3. 
78-437 CALIFANO v. WESTCOTT 
78-689 SHARP v. WESTCOTT Argued 4/16/79 
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BB 4/17/79 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-437, Califano v. Westcott 
I have the following brief comments following 
oral argument in this case. 
1. Merits -- I do not think that the SG 
raised any arguments to strengthen his defense of the 
constitu~tionality of the statute. That defense rests 
fundamentally on the suggestion that the statute is 
addressed to the specific poblem of fathers deserting 
their families, in order to meet the single-parent 
criterion for eligibility. The flaw in this argument 
is the sex-biased assumption that paternal desertion 
is always (or usually) caused by paternal rather than 
maternal unemployment. As I pointed out in my Bench 
Memorandum, there does not appear to be any evidence 
in the legislative record to support the empirical 
assumption that paternal desertion results from 
paternal unemployment. Where there is no evidence 
2. 
adduced to support such a gender-biased classification 
as the one contained in the present statute, and where 
the present involvement of women in the labor force 
makes it likely that pressures for paternal desertion 
are often generated by maternal unemployment (as in the 
present case), I think that the Court should hold the 
statute unconstitutionally discriminatory. 
2. Remedy It seems clear from oral argument 
that the question of remedy will divide the Court. I 
stand by my analysis of the problem in my Bench 
Memorandum, with the following caveat. 
Justice Rehnquist did suggest in one of his 
questions at oral argument a possible way of ~ea~hing 
a compromise position. As I understood him, he 
suggested that the DC only certified a class in which 
----------------------~--------------the families had an unemployed motherJ and a father who 
was not a part of the work force. If that is so, then 
relief ordered should not have gone beyond the limits 
of this class. Accordingly, the relief would be 
consistent with the principal breadwinner theory 
for reconstruction of the statute, since only families --- -----------------
3. 
in which the mother is the principal breadwinner 
would be granted relief. Two further questions 
whether the unemployment of a mother who is not the 
principal breadwinner, or that of a father who is not 
the principal breadwinner, should qualify the family 
for benefits -- would be left for later resolution. 
There is some basis for Justice Rehnquist's 
suggestion about the class actually certified. The 
named plaintiffs in the DC did have the characteristics 
mentioned by Justice Rehnquist (unemployed mother, 
non-working father). And the motion for class 
certification which was granted by the DC described 
the class as "those families with two parents 
in the home ... who would otherwise be eligible for 
AFDC ... but for the sex discrimination in the federal 
statute ... which provide[s] for the granting of federally 
funded AFDC ... to families deprived of support because 
of the unemployment of their father, but not to families 
deprived of support because of the mother's unemployment." 
Since a family in which the mother is not the principal 
breadwinner is not "deprived of support" by her 
unemployment, those families, at least arguably, were not 
4. 
part of the class certified. I hope that the 
Conference will discuss this possible approach to 
the remedy issue. 
BB 4/18/79 
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM 
To: Mr. Justice Powell 
Re: No. 78-437, Califano v. Westcott 
The plaintiffs in this case did not seek 
retroactive benefits, so their only claim was for 
declaratory and injunctive relief. 
78-437 Califano v. Westcott 
12~~21 Sharp v. Westcott 
The · Chief Justice 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
<; - D { ttJ tf R Ac.tfl-4f ~ j
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May 2, 1979 
PERSONAL 
78-689 - Alexander Sharp, II, etc. v. 
Cindy Westcott, et al. 
r Lewis: 
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May 3, 1979 
78-689 Sharp v. Westcott 
Dear Chief: 
I will be qlad to try a dissent. 
At thP Conference I aqrepd ~ith Potter that the DC 
should not havP rewritten the statute. It should have oiven 
a declRratory iudqment an~ issued an injunction and left the 
rewritino to Conqress. 
The District Court, hAvina undertaken to devise an 
affirmative reme~v, should have focuse~ on "t~e prin~ical 
waqe earner". 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: Mr . Justice Stewart 
Mr . Justice Rehnquist 
.§upuntt <!;ourl of tlrt ~nitt~ .§¥rs-
'Jllas-.frhtgton, !D. <!J. 2D?J!-,3 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE J OH N PA UL STEVENS 
J une 4, 1 97 9 
Re: 78-437; 689 - Califano v. Westcott 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Respectfully, 
r-
Mr . Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
RE: 
.Su:prtntt ~omt of t£rt 'Jiinittb ;§t2ttes 
~a,glfittghm. ~. ~· 20.;tJ!~ 
June 4, 1979 
Nos. 78-437 & 689 Califano v. Westcott & 
Pratt v. Westcott 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
cc: The Conference 
·-
.;§u:prtm.t <!Jourt of tfrt ~t~ ~tatts 
~~Ul~ghm. ~. <!J. 2C~J!.~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
,,,..-T•r> "'YR0N R WHITF June 4, 1979 
Re: Nos. 78-437 & 78-689 - Califano & Pratt v. 
Westcott 
Dear Harry, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
A: _/ 
( - • I 
Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Copies to the Conference 
cmc 
• 
~ltJlrtutt <!fo-u:rt o-f tlrt ~tittb .®tatts 
'UJaslri:ngLtn, :!9. <!f. 20,?J!..;t 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
June 4, 1979 
Re: Nos. 78-437 & 689 - Califano v. Westcott & 
Pratt v. Westcott 
Dear Harry: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
T,M. 
Mr. Justice Blackrnun 
cc: The Conference 
PBS-6/6/79 
DRAFT OPINION 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Paul 
RE: Califano v. Westcott, No. 78-437; Califano v. Pratt, No. 
78-689 
DATE: June 6, 1979 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I agree with the Court that § 407 violates the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. In my view, 
however, the court below exceeded the proper limits of its 
o..-LJ-. 
powers when it ordered the extension of benefits to~families in 
which a mother has become unemployed. This extension reinstates 
a system of distributing benefits that Congress ~y rejected 
when it amended § 407 in 1968. Rather than frustrate the 
further payment of benefits 
the cour~ have enjoined any 
tt--1--1-,/. -~~,,.. }l...t..... (~ 1.fi. :,...,..,; ftwtuf.. to ~{ 
~1"\ unconsti utional ,_ ba~ 
~ 
o.bviey.a~ intent of Congress, 
~ 
Because .the Court today approves · t..R-i-5 order, I dissent. 
2. 
"Where a statute is defective because of 
underinclusion there exists two remedial 
alternatives: a court may either declare it a 
nullity and order that its benefits not extend to 
the class that the legislature intended to 
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the 
statute to include those who are aggrieved by 
exclusion." Welsh v. United States, 398 u.s. 333, 
361 (1970) (concurring opinion). 
4,,{.,-dt( 
In choosing between these alternatives, a court ·~ 
I 
attempt to accomodate as fully as possible the policies and 
judgments expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole. 
See id., at 365-366 and n. 18. It may not use its remedial 
~.( •t _, 
powers to thwart the intent of the legislature Ato achieve 
concededly legitimate objects. 
The Court correctly observes that "the gender 
qualification [of § 407] was part of the general objectives 
of the 1968 amendments to tighten standards for eligibility 
'·· r·:7f~d4 .. .., 1W 
at ~- J;A partigular and reduce program costs." ~, 
~A to " ~-.,' L llu.,J'U-~'IM-~ +-
Congress 1\w.as "oncer:oed ::t.h..a.t 
11 
benefits weule be entel'\eed to 
~~ 




'f'l-l:Od ~e-e-i-~ e. principal wage-earner continued to 
~~w 
It is indisputable that Congress waRE€d to prohibit payment 
"( 
of AFDC-UF benefits to families where the breadwinner 
remained employed. Yet the result of the Court's decision 
affirming the District Court's relief is to compel exactly 
the extension of benefits Congress wished to prevent. l/ 
-~ 
The relief that perhaps would best approximate 
what Congress appears to have intended would limit payment 
of benefits to those families in which the principal wage-
earner, regardless of gender, has become unemployed. But 
~~· 
this approach presents sev~r~l difficulties. It involves 
more than an extension of benefits to a class not 
previously covered: Some families currently eligible for 
AFDC-UF funds would be excluded. Moreover, only with great 
difficulty could the criterion of the "principal wage-
earner" be implemented "within the administrative framework 














{cdnst1tut1o~al ~law in the program is corrected. Unlike 
) the relief approved by the Court today, it is not manifest 
~ that enjoining of the program would thwart the intent of 
1 Congress. The extension of AFDC benefits to families 
\ 
• suffering only from unemployment was a relatively recent 
development in the history of the program, which Congress 
made permanent only on the understanding that payments 
1
would be limited to cases where the principal wage-earner 
was out of work. It is far from clear that Congress would 
have approved this extension if it knew that benefits would 
be paid whenever either parent became unemployed. In 
addition, the hardships caused by enjoining the program to 
those families which Congress ~~ e to assist can be 
.. db~l'l' .. ~ . m1t1gate y ~ eg1s at1ve prov1s1on ~A retroact1ve 
benefits. !;_/ 
In sum, the relief approved by the Court today 
violates established principles governing the fashioning 
1 equitable relief and ensures frustration of legitimate 
legislative goals expressed in § 407. Accordingly, I 
4. 
FN1. 
1. The Court suggests that payments to families 
where a breadwinner remains employed is not inconsistent 
with the Act, because in cases where a parent becomes 
incapacitated, benefits are paid regardless of the other 
parent's employment status or history. 42 U.S.C. § 606(a); 
see ante, at n. 9. This overlooks the special 
circumstances involved when a parent suffers from an 
incapacity. In the great majority of such cases, the 
family must bear not only the costs of income lost through 
the one parent's unemployment, but also substantial medical 
expenses resulting from the disability. 
2. The fact that none of the parties here has 
~) 
sought this step, a point _~ which the Court,..t ~ace~ .. g,J;,e.a..t 
~' is irrelevant. This issue should turn on the 
intent of Congress, not the interests of the parties. A 
court no less is "infringing legislative prerogatives," 
~' at 22, when it acts at the behest of the particular 
litigants before it, than when it chooses a remedy on its 
own initiative. 
FIRST DRAFT 
Califano v. Westcott, No. 78-437; Prptt v. Westcott, No. 78-
689 
Mr. Justice Powell, concurring in part and dissenting 
in part. 
I agree with the Court that § 407 violates the equal 
protection component of the Fifth Amendment. In my view, 
however, the court below erred when it ordered the extension of 
benefits to all families in which a mother has become 
unemployed. This extension reinstates a system of distributing 
benefits that Congress rejected when it amended § 407 in 1968. 
Rather than frustrate the clear intent of Congress, the court 
simply should have enjoined any further payment of benefits 
under the provision found to be unconstitutional. 
As Mr. Justice Harlan observed, 
"Where a statute is defective because of 
underinclusion there exist two remedial 
alternatives: a court may either declare it a 
nullity and order that its benefits not extend to 
the class that the legislature intended to 
benefit, or it may extend the coverage of the 
statute to include those who are aggrieved by 
exclusion." Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 
361 (1970) (concurring op1n1on). 
In choosing between these alternatives, a court should 
attempt to accommodate as fully as possible the policies 
and judgments expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole. 
See id;, at 365-366 and n. 18. It should not use its 
remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the 
legislature. 
· The Court correctly observes that "the gender 
qualification [of § 407] was part of the general objectives 
of the 1968 amendments to tighten standards for eligibility 
and reduce program costs." Ante, at 10. It is clear that 
Congress intended to proscribe the payment of benefits to 
families where only one parent was unemployed and where the 
principal wage-earner continued to work. 
"From all that appears, Congress, with an image of 
the 'traditional family' in mind, simply assumed 
that the father would be the family breadwinner, 
and that the mother's employment role, if any, 
would be secondary." I~id. 
Yet the result of the Court's decision affirming the 
District Court's relief is to compel exactly the extension 
of benefits Congress wished to prevent. l/ 
Rather than thus rewriting § 407, we should leave 
this task to Congress. Now that we have held that this 
statute constitutes impermissible gender-based 
discrimination, it is the duty and function of the 
legislative branch to review its AFDC-UF program in light 
of ' our decison and make such changes therein as it deems 
appropriate. Leaving the resolution to Congress is 
especially desirable in cases such as this one, where the 
2. 
3. 
allocation and distribution of welfare funds are peculiarly 
within the province of the legislative branch. See 
Califano v. Jobst, 434 u.s. 47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 ____.._. 
U.S. 464, 479 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 
(1970). 
We cannot predict what Congress thinks will be in 
the best interest of its total welfare program. The 
extension of AFDC benefits to families suffering only from 
unemployment was a relatively recent development in the 
history of the program, a development that Congress made 
permanent only on the understanding that payments would be 
limited to cases where the principal wage-earner was out of 
work. We cannot assume that Congress in 1968 would have 
approved this extension if it had known that ultimately 
payments would be made whenever either parent became 
unemployed. Nor can we assume that Congress now would 
adopt such a system in light of the Court's ruling that § 
407 is invalid. 
The Court emphasizes the hardships that may be 
caused by enjoining the program until Congress can act. 
There is the possibility, not mentioned by the Court, that 
other hardships might be occasioned in the allocating of 
limited funds as a result of court-ordered extension of . 
these particular benefits. In any event, Congress has the 
option to mitigate hardships by providing promptly for 
retroactive payments. An injunction prohibiting further 
payments at least will conserve the funds appropriated 
until Congress determines which group, if any, it does want 
to assist. The relief ordered by the Court today, in 
contrast, ensures the irretrievable payment of funds to a 
class of recipients Congress did not wish to benefit.~/ 
Because it is clear that Congress intended to 
prevent the result mandated today, and that the 
reexamination of § 407 required under our decision properly 
should be made by Congress, I dissent. 
4. 
1. The relief that perhaps would best approximate 
what Congress appears to have intended would limit payment 
of benefits to those families in which the principal wage-
earner, regardless of gender, has become unemployed. But 
this approach presents several difficulties, as the Court 
demonstrates. Ante, at 14-16. Under these circumstances, --..... 
the modification of the order sought by appellant in No. 
78-689 properly was rejected. 
The Court suggests that payments to families where 
a breadwinner remains employed are not inconsistent with 
the Act, because in cases where a parent becomes 
incapacitated, benefits are paid regardless of the other 
parent's employment status or history. 42 u.s.c. § 606(a); 
see ante, at 15 n. 9. This overlooks the special 
circumstances involved when a parent suffers from an 
incapacity. In such cases, the family usually must bear 
not only the costs of income lost through the one parent's 
unemployment, but also medical and otherexpenses resulting 
from the disability that often are quite substantial. 
2. The fact that none of the parties here has 
sought this step, a point which the Court emphasizes, is 
irrelevant. This issue should turn on the intent of 
Congress, not the interests of the parties. A court no 
less is "infringing legislative prerogatives," ~' at 15, 
when it acts at the behest of the particular litigants 
before it, than when it chooses a remedy on its own 
initiative. 
FN1. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL,hconcurring in part and dissenting in 
part. 
I agree with the Court that § 407 violates the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment. In my view, how-
ever, the court below erred when it ordered the extension of 
benefits to all families in which a mother has become unem-
ployed. This extension reinstates a system of distributing 
benefits that Congress rejected when it amended § 407 in 1968. 
Rather than frustrate the clear intent of Congress, the court 
simply should have enjoined any further payment of benefits 
under the provision found to be unconstitutional. 
As Mr. Justice Harlan observed, 
"Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion 
there exist two remedial alternatives : a court may either 
declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend 
to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it 
may extend the coverage of the statute to include those 
who are aggrieved by exclusion." Welsh v. United States, 
398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970) (concurring opinion) . 
In choosing between these alternatives, a court should attempt 
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to accommoda.te as fully as possible the policies and judgments 
expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole. See id., at 
365-366, and n. 18. It should not use its remedial powers to 
circumvent the intent of the legislature. 
The Court correctly observes that "the gender qualification 
[of § 407] was part of the general objectives of the 1968 
amendments to tighten standards for eligibility and reduce 
program costs." Ante, at 10. It is clear that Congress in-
tended to proscribe the payment of benefits to families where 
only one parent was unemployed and where the principal 
wage earner continue to work. 
"From all that appears, Congress, with an image of the 
'traditional family' in mind, simply assumed tha.t the 
father would be the family breadwinner, and that the 
mother's employment role, if any, would be secondary." 
Ibid. 
Yet the result of the Court's decision affirming the District 
Court's relief is to compel exactly the extension of benefits 
Congress wished to prevent.1 
Rather than thus rewriting § 407, we should leave this task 
to Congress. Now that we have held tha.t this statute con-
1 The relief that perhaps would best approximate what Congress appears 
to have intended would limit payment of benefits to those families in which 
the principal wage earner, regardless of gender, has become unemployed. 
But this approach presents several difficulties, as the Court demonstrates . 
Ante, at 14-16. Under these circumstances, the mod:fication of the order 
sought by appellant in No. 78-689 properly was rejected. 
The Court suggests that payments to families where a breadwinner re-
mains employed are not inconsistent with the Act, because in cases where 
a parent become~:> incapacitated, benefits are paid regardless of the other 
parent's employment l'!tatus or history. 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a); see ante, 
at 15 n. 9. This overlook~:> the special circumstances involved when a 
parent ::mffer3 from an incapacity. In such cases, the family usually must 
bear not only the costs of income lost through the one parent's unemploy-
ment, but abo medical and other expensest.:esulting from the disability 
that often are quite substantial. L..... 
7 437 & 78-689-CONCUR & DISSENT 
CALIFANO v. WESTCOTT - 3 
stitutes impermissible gender-based discrimination, it is the 
duty and function of the Legislative Branch to review its 
AFDC-UF program in light of our decision and make such 
changes therein as it deems appropriate. Leaving the resolu-
tion to Congress is especially desirable in cases such as this 
one, where the allocation and distribution of welfare funds 
are peculiarly within the province of the Legislative Branch. 
See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U. S. 47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U. S. 464, 479 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
(1970). 
We cannot predict what Congress thinks will be in the best 
interest of its total welfare program. The extension of AFDC 
benefits to families sufl"ering only from unemployment was a 
relatively recent development in the history of the program, 
a development that Congress made permanent only on . the 
understanding that payments could be limited to cases where 
the principal wage earner was out of work. We cannot as-
sume that Congress in 1968 would have approved this exten-
sion if it had known that ultimately payments would be made 
whenever parent became unemployed. Nor can we assume 
that Congress now would adopt such a system in light of the 
Court's ruling that § 407 is invalid. 
The Court emphasizes the hardships that may be caused by 
enjoining the program until Congress can act. There is the 
possibility, not mentioned by the Court, that other hardships 
might be occasioned in the allocating of limited funds as a 
result of court-ordered extension of these particular benefits. 
In any event, Congress has the option to mitigate hardships 
by providing promptly for retroactive payments. An injunc-
tion prohibiting further payments at least will conserve the 
funds appropriated until Congress determines which group, if 
any, it does want to assist. The relief ordered by the Court 
today, in contrast, ensures the irretrievable payment of funds 
to a class of recipients Congress did not wish to benefit.2 
%The fact that none of tlw partie~ lwrc ha.~ sought this step, a point 
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Because it is clear that Congress intended ~prevent there .. 
suit mandated today, and that the re-exami~on of § 407 re .. 
quired under our decision properly should be tnade by-
Congress, I dis~ent, 
which the Court emphaRizrs, is irrelevant . This bHue should turn on 
the intent of Congress, not thr interests of thr parties. A rourt no less 
is "infringing legislative prerogat1ves," ante, at 15, when it acts at the 
behest of the particular litigantR before it , than when 1t chooses a remedy 
on its own initiative. 
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MR. JusTICE PowELL, with whorri THE CHIEF JusTICE ~ 
. MR. JusTICE TEWAR] join, concurring in part and dissenting I 
in part. 
I agree with the Court that § 407 violates the equal protec-
tion component of the Fifth Amendment. In my view, how-
ever, the court below erred when it ordered the extension of 
benefits to all families in which a mother has become unem-
ployed. This extension reinstates a system of distributing 
benefits that Congress rejected when it amended § 407 in 1968. 
Rather than frustrate the clear intent of Congress, the court 
simply should have enjoined any further payment of benefits 
under the provision found to be unconstitutional. 
As Mr. Justice Harlan observed, 
"Where a statute is defective because of underinclusion 
there exist two remedia.l alternatives: a court may either 
declare it a nullity and order that its benefits not extend 
to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it 
may extend the coverage of the statute to include those 
who are aggrieved by exclusion." Welsh v. United States. 
398 U. S. 333, 361 (1970) (concurring opinion). 
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In choosing between these alternatives, a court should attempt 
to accommoda.te as fully as possible the policies and judgments 
expressed in the statutory scheme as a whole. See id., at 
365-366, and n. 18. It should not use its remedial powers to 
circumvent the intent of the legislature. 
The Court correctly observes that "the gender qualification 
[of § 407] was part of the general objectives of the 1968 
amendments to tighten standards for eligibility and reduce 
program costs." Ante, at 10. It is clear that Congress in-
tended to proscribe the payment of benefits to families where 
only one parent was unemployed and where the principal 
wage earner continue to work. 
"From all that appears, Congress, with an image of the 
'traditional family' in mind, simply assumed tha.t the 
father would be the family breadwinner, and that the 
mother's employment role, if any, would be secondary." 
Ibid. 
Yet the result of the Court's decision affirming the District 
Court's relief is to compel exactly the extension of benefits 
Congress wished to prevent.1 
Rather than thus rewriting § 407, we should leave this task 
1 The relief that perhaps would best approximate what Congress appears 
to have intended would limit payment of benefits to those families in which 
the principal wage earner, regardless of gender, has become unemployed. 
But this approach presents several difficulties, as the Court demonstrates. 
Ante, at 14-16. Under the:se circumstances, the mod:fication of the order 
sought by appellant in No. 78-689 properly was :rejected. 
The Court suggests that payments to families where a breadwinner re-
mains employed are not inconsistent with the Act, because in cases where 
a parent becomes incapacitated, benefits are paid regardless of the other 
parent's employment status or history. 42 U. S. C. § 606 (a); see ante, 
at 15 n. 9. This overlook:; the special circumstances involved when a 
parent suffer3 from an incapacity. In such cases , the family usually must 
bear not only the costs of income lost through the one parent's unemploy- t 
ment, but also medical and other expense3 result~* from the disability 
that often are quite sl.l:b&tan tial. 
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~o Congress. Now thap we h~tve held that this statute con-
stitutes impermissibie ~enderlbl'tsed discrimination, it is the 
duty and function of the Legislative Branch to review ·its 
AFDC-UF program in :light of our decision and 1nake such 
changes therein as it deems appropriate. Leaving the resolu-
tion to Congress is especially desirable in' cAses such as this 
one, where the allocation and distribution ' of welfare ful.1ds 
l:tre peculiarly within the province of the 'Legislative Branch. 
See Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 
U. S. 464, 479 (1977); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U. S. 471 
(1970). 
We cannot predict what Congress thinks will be in the best 
interest· of its total welfare program. ' The extension of AFDC 
benefits to families suffering only from unemployment was a 
relatively recet1t development in the history 'of the program, 
a developmen~ ' tha~ Co11gress made perm~n~np 011ly on ··~h~ 
understanding that payments could be limified to Cllses where 
phe principal wage earner was out of work: We C!Umqt as-
sume that Congress in 1968 would have approved this exten-
sion if it had known that ultimately payments would be made 
whenever. either parent became unemployed. Nor can we 
assume that Congress now would adopt such a system in light 
of the Court's ruling that § 407 is invalid, 
The Court emphasizes the hardships that may be caused by 
enjoining the program until Congress can act. There is the 
possibility, not mentioned by the Court, that other hardships 
might be occasioned in the allocating of limited funds as a 
result of court-ordered extension of these particular benefits. 
In any event, Congress has the option to mitigate hardships 
by providing promptly for retroactive payments. An injunc-
tion prohibiting further payments at least will conserve the 
funds appropriated until Congress determines which grpup, if 
any, it does want to assist. The relief ordered by the Court 
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today, in contrast, ensures the irretrievable payment of fu.nds 
to a class of recipients Congress did not wish to benefit,2 
Because it is clear that Congress intended to prevent there-
sult mandated today, and that the re-examination of § 407 re,. } 
quired under our decision properly shqul~ be ~ade 'by 
Cpngress, I dis§ent1 
2 T~ fact tha.t n0ne of the parties here has sou~t this step, a point 
which the Court emphasizes, is irrelevant. This k;sue should turn on 
the intent of Congress, not the interests of the parties. A court no less 
is "infringing legislative prerogatives," ante, at 15, when it acts at the 
behest of the particular litigants before it, than when it choose:; a remedy 
on its own initi.ative. 
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Please join me in your opinion, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part, in this case. 
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